This paper provides a theory of the interactions between knowledge codi…cation, …rm-level organization structures, information di¤usion and the dynamics of technological competition. At the …rm level, we focus on incentives to design Knowledge Management policies based on the codi…cation of soft into hard information. At the aggregate level, we discuss the endogenous nature of knowledge spillover and the implications for macroeconomic growth. The model predicts the existence of a bell shaped relationship between knowledge codi…cation and technological competition.
"Evidence from research conducted since the mid-1960s shows that [...] managers get two thirds of their information to make decisions from face-to-face or telephone conversations; they acquire the remaining third from documents, most of which come from outside the organization", (Davenport, 1994 , Harvard Business Review).
Introduction
Nowadays, Knowledge Management is receiving tremendous attention within companies and among business academics. 1 A landmark study by OECD (2003) …nds that Knowledge Management (KM) practices are by now a widespread phenomenon across countries, concentrated not only in high tech/knowledge-intensive industries but also in more traditional manufacturing industries. On the academic front, business gurus keep on stressing the importance of KM as a necessary tool to achieve competitiveness in the so-called "Knowledge-based Economy" 2 . Surprisingly, economists have so far paid little attention to this recent phenomenon.
Conceptually, KM is about "a range of practices used in an organisation to identify, create, represent, distribute and enable adoption of insights and experiences. Such insights and experiences comprise knowledge, either embodied in individuals or embedded in organisational processes or practice" (Wikipedia). Given the importance that information ‡ows and knowledge have for innovation, market success and socioeconomic relationships, KM therefore leads naturally to a number of interesting and important economic questions. How should a …rm manage the nature and di¤usion of its informational ‡ows in a given competitive environment? Should it codify its processes or should it rely on the existence of tacit knowledge? What are the macroeconomic implications for the dynamics of innovation and economic growth? In this paper, we provide a …rst theoretical attempt to discuss and understand these issues.
We emphasize the basic transformation of soft information into hard information. Typically, this transformation takes place through a codi…cation process that systematically increases the transfer capacity of information across individuals. We identify a crucial trade-o¤: Codi…cation of information enables veri…ability by a third party and therefore allows the design of more explicit and e¢ cient contracts within a given group of contracting agents; for the very same reason however, codi…cation leads to increased possibilities of informational spillover to other third parties who might exploit these spillover to out-compete the initial contracting group. In this paper, we consider this trade-o¤ within the context of innovating …rms where contracting and transfer of information is important for e¢ cient production. We investigate the aggregate consequences of this …rm-level trade-o¤ in term of organizational structures, dynamics of technological competition and macroeconomic growth. For this purpose, a standard Schumpeterian growth model with quality ladder a la Aghion and Howitt (1992) or Grossman and Helpman (1991) is coupled to a model of internal organization of the …rm characterized by an endogenous dimension of contract incompleteness.
We consider a theoretical framework where success in R&D competition depends crucially on informational spillover. At each date creative-destruction happens in the sense that R&D may result in the discovery by an Entrepreneur of a new leading-edge technology which forces the incumbent …rm to exit the market. At each date, production by the successful Entrepreneur is a two stage process: there is a "quality" stage where a set of strategic actions must be undertaken by an Agent hired by the Entrepreneur in order to adapt the leading-edge technology to an exogenously changing market environment; then there is a "quantity" stage where workers are hired to produce with the technology.
During the quality stage, the Entrepreneur must transmit to the Agent some information about the set of correct strategic actions. Actions being costly to the Agent, there is room for moral-hazard and hold-up: indeed we assume that due to imperfect veri…ability by a third party the Agent can always choose a wrong action at a lower cost. This moral hazard problem can be solved by the Entrepreneur through two di¤erent margins: the KM policy and the organizational structure.
We consider two types of information transmission policies (ie. KM policies). The Entrepreneur can have a "face-to-face" interaction with the Agent where information on actions remains soft and there is only transmission of the bit of information relevant for the current period. Alternatively, the Entrepreneur can undertake codi…cation where the Agent receives a blueprint (or plan of actions) specifying the set of relevant actions. In this way, soft information is transformed into hard information.
Codi…cation allows the writing of formal contracts that solve the moral-hazard problem. At the same time though, codi…cation has a cost in term of informational spillover as we assume that the share of hard information is immediately available to other R&D competitors who may use it to leapfrog the leading edge …rm. Hence, in spite of the moral hazard problem, the entrepreneur may still choose to keep information soft in order to reduce competitive pressures. The Entrepreneur can mix the two policies by codifying only a share of the actions while the residual share of information remains soft and is transmitted through face-to-face interaction.
We consider two di¤erent organizational structures. The …rst one corresponds to "in-house" relational labor contracts involving a repeated relationship between the Entrepreneur and the Agent.
In such a situation, the moral-hazard problem is solved through the delivery of an ex-post informal bonus that is paid if the Agent has undertaken the set of correct actions. The second one corresponds to joint-ownership of production by the Entrepreneur and the Agent. The Agent internalizes now the surplus enhancing e¤ect of choosing the correct actions and this therefore solves the moral hazard problem.
We analyze how the optimal KM policy of …rms (ie. the share of soft information) interacts with their optimal organizational structure (in-house versus joint-ownership) and their competitive environment. Our …rst partial-equilibrium result is that joint-ownership is compatible with more informational softness than in-house production. The reason is that under in-house relational contracts and large informational softness, the moral-hazard problem is so severe than the Entrepreneur may be tempted to renege ex-post on the (large) bonus. To the contrary, joint-ownership is an ex-ante commitment and can thus credibly sustain larger informational softness. As a consequence joint-ownership limits codi…cation and informational spillover toward competitors. This makes joint-ownership optimal when technological competition is intense. By contrast, in-house production with codi…cation is preferred by the Entrepreneur when intensity of technological competition is low. In that case information spillover are not too harmful, codi…cation dampens the moral hazard problem and this reduces the share of the surplus that the Entrepreneur must transfer to the Agent.
Closing the model in general equilibrium allows us to derive implications at the macroeconomic level. We provide two interesting comparative statics. First, we highlight the existence of a Bell-shaped e¤ect of technological competition on codi…cation. We believe this result to be roughly consistent with some patterns of long run development of various developed economies: the switch from craftsmanship to mass-production and then to the "knowledge-based" economy (see Mokyr, 2002 , for a discussion).
In particular, our analysis suggests that the increased di¤usion of Information Technologies may paradoxically induce an increased reliance on soft information and tacit knowledge; this being also associated with major shifts in terms of work organizational structures at the corporate level. This view is consistent with some stylized facts uncovered by Autor, Murnane and Levy (2003) .
Second, our theoretical analysis relates to the nature of scale e¤ects involved in the growth process, namely the fact that growth rates are positively related to the stock of resources available for innovation and R&D. The debate in the growth literature focuses on the strength of those scale e¤ects: While evidence based on historical trends in the very long run is compatible with the existence of strong scale e¤ects, empirical studies of growth patterns based on post WWII evidence suggest that scale e¤ects are in fact quite weak (see Jones, 2005 , for a discussion). By endogenizing information ‡ows (soft versus hard) and the associated structure of spillover in the economy, our approach provides an explanation for the changing nature of scale e¤ects during the growth process.
The paper is then organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and how we contribute to it. Section 3 then describes some stylized facts from the Knowledge Management literature that our model will incorporate. Section 4 presents formally the model. In Section 5, the model is solved and the main results are discussed. Our comparative statics are then performed in section 6.
Finally, section 7 concludes. Proofs and formal assumptions are relegated to the appendix.
Related literature
This paper is related to several strands of literature. In our framework, the degree of contractual incompleteness is endogenous. This is related to Battigalli and Maggi (2002) who argue that the limit to contractual completeness comes from the direct cost of writing contracts. Here we rather emphasize the importance of information spillover and outside competition in a¤ecting incompleteness. Our model endogenizes the mix between formal aspects of organization (understood as job description, formal contracts, etc.) and the informal aspects (as relational contracts, reputation, and non contractual dimensions, etc.). This mix is a crucial feature of organizations; it has long been emphasized by the sociological literature and more recently addressed by the economic literature (see Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 2002) . Our paper contributes to this line of research by highlighting that this mix is endogenous and shaped by the policy of knowledge codi…cation at the …rm level. This paper also contributes to a recent emerging literature analyzing the links between the internal organization of the …rm and macroeconomic growth. Thesmar and Thoenig (2000) for instance consider a model in which …rms implement production projects through two alternative organizational structures. They can choose between a "mechanistic" organization that provides high productivity at the expense of a sunk cost and an "organistic" organization that provides low productivity without sunk costs. Larger growth through creative destruction reduces the expected lifetime of projects and therefore reduces the …rms' incentives to adopt the "mechanistic" organizations. In this way, the macroeconomic environment impinges on the organizational choices of …rms. On the other hand, …rms'organizational choices feed back into the growth rate of the economy as changes in organizational structures a¤ect the …rms'pro…tability and research activity. Martimort and Verdier (2004) investigate the possibility of internal self-enforcing collusive agreements between workers within the …rm and how it interacts with the macroeconomy. Typically, long lived projects and their associated repeated interactions allow managers to sustain collusive outcomes which bring ine¢ ciencies at the …rm level. Larger innovation rates increase the turnover of projects and undermine this capacity of self enforced collusion. This in turn increases the internal e¢ ciency of the …rms and stimulates further incentives for research and innovations.
Closest to our work, François and Roberts (2003) analyze the contracting problem between the owner of an innovation (the …rm) and a manager that is supposed to implement the project. In an incomplete contracting setting, they also emphasize two types of self enforcing contracts that can solve the hold-up problem between the innovator and the manager. In the …rst case ("the contractor" case), the moral hazard problem resides in the manager that needs to provide the right e¤ort after the innovator committed payments. In the other case ("the internal labor market"), the …rm is subject to moral hazard in the payment after the manager already provided his e¤ort. Growth and turnover makes it harder for the …rm to sustain the "internal labor market" self enforcing solution. This shifts the optimal organizational structure towards the "contractor" solution, moving the division of the surplus in favor of the manager. This in turn a¤ects negatively the incentives for innovation and macroeconomic growth.
A distinctive element of our work is the idea that …rms can control the degree of information softness present in their organizational structure. This feature has two consequences. First, with knowledge codi…cation, a …rm can increase the level of explicit contracting with its workers within its organization. Second, the resulting degree of information softness a¤ects the level of knowledge external spillover that competitors enjoy, impacting therefore the competitive pressures that this …rm will face. The nature of endogenous knowledge spillover generates then a feedback e¤ect from the microstructure of the …rm to macroeconomic growth.
Beyond internal relational labor contracts, we also allow …rms to have the possibility to have joint ownership with the manager and to rely on ex-post bilateral bargaining. As in Francois and Roberts (2003) , when growth increases, this strategy becomes more likely. The mechanism through which this occurs however is di¤erent. In Francois and Roberts (2003) , as growth increases, faster turnover makes it harder for the …rm to sustain an "internal labor market" self enforcing solution.
At some point, …rms cannot credibly commit to paying employees in the future for e¤ort exerted today and the only possibility then is to shift to the "contractor" solution and leave to the manager an ex-ante "e¢ ciency" wage. In the present paper, ownership leaves ex-post rents to the manager and solves his moral hazard problem irrespective of the degree of information softness. Given this, the …rm is able to implement a full degree of internal information softness. This in turn reduces knowledge spillover and the probability to be leapfrogged by a competitor, increasing thereby the expected lifetime of the …rm. This option is all the more valuable the larger the growth rate of the economy. Hence, in addition to a¤ect the division of the surplus between the …rm and the manager, a change of organizational structure in our model also a¤ects the nature of informational ‡ows in the economy, providing therefore a further channel of impact on the incentives for innovation and thereby macroeconomic growth.
Finally, at a more general level, a signi…cant amount of work emphasizes the importance of technological spillover in models of endogenous growth, development, international trade and economic geography. It is well known that results emanating from these models are drastically a¤ected by the speci…cation of spillover (local vs global). While aware that the size and scope of spillover are linked to the existence of soft information (see Krugman 1991) most of these theories take the nature of spillover as exogenously given. Our model is a …rst step towards endogenizing this aspects by providing micro-foundations of some information transmission processes.
Stylized Facts on knowledge management
Before getting into the formal analysis, we outline in this section some stylized facts from the Knowledge Management and related Business literature that we think are relevant for our theoretical framework.
The tacit component of Knowledge
The standard approach in the economics of information is to consider knowledge as sharing public good characteristics such as non rivalry and costless transferability (see Arrow 1962) . Still, there is a well established tradition among practitioners of the …rm insisting on the fact that knowledge is partially tacit and only partially transferable (Davenport, Konoka, Von Hippel 1994, Nickerson and Zender 2002) . In the economic literature, Polanyi (1958) is the …rst to establish the existence of a component of knowledge which is essentially tacit, contextual and not easily expressible to someone else. Nelson and Winter (1982) also emphasizes the importance of knowledge tacitness and information softness in skill-intensive activities.
The concept of tacit knowledge has also been popularized by the school of Sociology of Scienti…c Knowledge. Studies by Collins (1974) for the case of the construction of the TEA laser or by McKenzie and Spinardi (1995) for the design and construction of nuclear weapons in the US during WWII, both emphasize the idea that some kind of knowledge deployed in scienti…c inquiry (ie. reading and interpreting the data, design of experimental instruments,...) is not transmitted among researchers through explicit and codi…ed statements.
KM policies are a mix between face-to-face interactions and codi…ed procedures
One important dimension of KM policies emphasized by the literature (Hansen, Norhia and Tierney 1999; Quintas 2003) is the fact that KM policies are basically a mix between two types of practices commonly used by …rms: so called "personalization" where knowledge remains in its tacit form and is shared through face-to-face interaction and "codi…cation" where information is hard, proceduralized and available to anyone in the company. Quoting Foray and Gault (2003) : " [In] Personnalization, knowledge remains in its tacit form and is closely bound to the person who developed it; it is shared primarily through person-to-person contact. To make this strategy work, companies invest heavily in networks of person (mobility, culture of bilateral interaction)...". On the other hand codi…cation involves the setup of written documents and regularly updated databases where training manuals, good work practices and more generally so-called "organizational memory"are stored. As such, codi…cation is more e¢ cient when supported by the intensive use of ICT.
Codi…cation of knowledge is a strategic choice variable
Case studies support the view that codi…cation of knowledge is not only driven by technological feasibility but results also from a strategic choice at the …rm level. Hansen et al., (1999) and codi…cation procedures, do this with the speci…c goal of information sharing and information capturing and that, even within an industry (ie. for the same types of products) the KM strategy may vary according to the external business strategy that the …rm seeks to develop.
Information softness reduces technological spillover across …rms
The innovation literature recognizes the importance of the distinction between tacit and codi…ed knowledge in understanding the role of technological spillover (Kogut and Zander 1996 , Teece 2005 , Audretsch, Keilbach and Lehman, 2006 . More speci…cally, the idea that information softness tends to reduce external technological spillover is consistent with evidence gathered in the empirical literature on technology spillover and di¤usion. An important stylized fact from that literature is the fact that knowledge spillover are spatially localized and that the scope of this spatial e¤ect is negatively linked to the existence of soft information (Audretsch and Feldman 1996 , Keller 2002 , Feldman and Lichtenberg 1997 . Indeed as pointed by Ja¤re (2002) geographical location is important in capturing the bene…ts of spillover only to the extent that the transfer of information is obtained through informal and localized interactions, as is typically the case for soft information and tacit knowledge items.
Conversely, codi…ed knowledge is more likely to lead to cross-…rm informational leakages. An interesting example of this is related to the case of "industrial espionage". Simm and Ferdinand (2006) discuss various case studies suggesting that informational leakages of that sort are greatly facilitated by the existence of encoded procedures and information blueprints. They report in particular the case of a bidding competition between Boeing and Lookheed worth 2$ billion contract for a US Air Force contract for rocket-launchers in 1988. In order to get access to con…dential information on its competitor, Boeing hired a former employee from Lookheed who brought with him proprietary documents of about 8,800 pages revealing secret information on Lookheed procedures. In a subsequent investigation, the US Air Force also found that Boeing had acquired other 25,000 Lockheed documents suggesting that the initial case was not an isolated incident and that information transfer from Lookheed to Boeing had been facilitated by Lookheed's codi…cation of knowledge into these documents and blueprints (Swartz 2003) .
Interestingly, the development of Information Technologies (IT) has also been reported to promote increased the vulnerability of the …rm's codi…ed information assets to spying attacks from "hackers," "cyberpunks," and even intelligence agencies.
KM policies come as a trade-o¤ between internal organizational constraints and external competitive pressures
The management literature emphasizes the view that knowledge management has to balance between internal organization constraints and external competition pressures (see Nickerson and Todd, 2002, and Sanchez and Heene, 1998) . As a matter of fact, the two-sided nature of soft information, both as a source of contract incompleteness inside a relationship and as a source of protection against external technological competition, is clearly illustrated by Sanchez and Heene (1998) in their literature survey on "Managing Articulated Knowledge in competence-based competition". On the one hand they acknowledge that : Much current discussion of knowledge in competence-based competition advances the proposition that a …rm's "tacit knowledge" is more likely to be a source of competitive advantage than the …rms' articulated or "non-tacit" knowledge [...] The di¢ culty of observing and acquiring "tacit knowledge" limits its di¤ usion beyond the …rm [...] . This view is consistent with the idea that information softness by reducing external informational spillover to competitors tends to provides bene…ts to the …rm. At the same time though, Sanchez and Heene (1998) also emphasize that:
Relying on "tacit knowledge" as a source of strategic advantage limits the ability of a …rm to leverage its knowledge [...] the potential for leveraging is much greater when that knowledge can be articulated, codi…ed", suggesting therefore some internal e¢ ciency costs to the …rm.
There is a recent decline in knowledge codi…cation associated with IT di¤usion
A recent paper by Autor, Murnane and Levy (2003) provides direct evidence that there has been a rise in non procedural activities since the 70s. Using samples of the CPS matched with representative data on job tasks requirements from the Dictionnary of Occupational Titles (DOT), they show that by 1998, non routine analytic task input averaged 6.8 centiles above its 1970 level and nonroutine interactive input averaged 11.5 centiles above its 1970 level. The main point of their paper is that this rise is pervasive at all educational levels and is accounted by the rapid di¤usion of computers at the industry level. While Autor and al.'s interpretation hinges on the fact that computers directly substitute to procedural tasks at the …rm level, this evidence is also consistent with the idea that the spread of IT, by triggering competition and imitation at the industry level, induces …rms to relax their degree of knowledge codi…cation and increase agents'empowerment as a defensive competitive strategy. As we will see this will be consistent with one of the main implications of the model.
The Setup
We consider a discrete time quality ladder growth model à la Grossman and Helpman (1991) 
Goods and factors of production
In period s, there is a numeraire competitive …nal good Y s using a continuum of intermediate goods
There are two types of production factors. First, there are H + 1 entrepreneurs endowed with human capital and are involved in innovation competition and …rm management. Second, there is unskilled labor in quantity L that is also freely mobile across sectors and used in project implementation and production of the intermediate goods.
Preferences
The representative consumer is endowed with the following intertemporal separable utility function:
where Y s corresponds to date s consumption and e s to the nominal cost of e¤ort. We assume 3 that the shadow price of e¤ort increases at the growth rate of this economy: e s+1 = (1 + g s )e s : There is a perfect credit market. Therefore, given the intertemporal linearity structure of preferences, the equilibrium real interest rate r is such that r = , the discount factor.
Technological Change and competition
In each industry i; at each period s there is an endogenous amount H is + 1 of entrepreneurs who are involved in technological competition in that sector. After discovering a leading-edge project, an entrepreneur must implement the project by creating a …rm and hiring workers. When ruling a …rm, that entrepreneur cannot undertake at the same time some research e¤ort. Hence research will be done by the H is entrepreneurs who are not currently managing a …rm.
We assume that in each period, each of the innovating entrepreneurs has a Poisson rate of success that depends on whether he bene…ts or not from informational spillover from the leading-edge …rm in his sector. More speci…cally, we assume that a given entrepreneur has a probability 2 ]0; 1[ to receive such informational spillover. In such a case, his success rate of innovation is (1 + " i ) 0 where " i captures the endogenous degree of knowledge spillover within industry i: We discuss below how the spillover parameter " i can be partially manipulated by the leading edge …rm in order to reduce the probability of being destroyed. With the residual probability 1 , the entrepreneur just enjoys a benchmark success rate 0 : We see that therefore captures the easiness with which …rms can learn crucial information on their competitors through reverse-engineering, "competitive intelligence" strategies or "industrial espionage" as described in section 3. An increase in could capture the rise of communication and information technologies in the economy. 4 From this, it follows that the per period rate of competitive pressure is ; which stands for the probability for a new project to be discovered in an industry i; is simply given by
Entrepreneurs can freely choose the sector in which they wish to undertake research. Active innovation in all sectors i 2 [0; 1] implies therefore the following arbitrage condition :
where V is is the …rm value to be at the leading edge in sector i starting at time s (to be computed later). Condition (3) simply says that the expected value of innovation should be the same across sectors.
Production and Hold-up
Within each industry i; each new project enhances the productivity of the previous leading-edge project by a parameter with 0 < log < 1: Then, within each period s; the leading edge …rm produces according to a two-stage process. Firstly, in the "quality"stage, a set of strategic tasks must be done in order to adapt the production process to changing environmental conditions. Secondly, in the "quantity" stage, an amount l of workers are hired in order to produce with the leading-edge technology:
where n is is the quality index of the leading edge-…rm in period s such that n is corresponds to the productivity of this …rm. Firm's unit cost of production is equal to c is = w s = n is where w s is the competitive wage prevailing on the labor market.
Consider …rst the "quantity" stage. Due to limit-pricing in Bertrand competition between the new project and the previous one, the price p is charged by the new …rm is equal to c is where c is is the new …rm's unit cost of production at time s. Using (1), this means that each project generates a cash- ‡ow equal to :
Consider now the "quality" stage. It needs to be undertaken by an Agent, hired on the unskilled labor market, whose job consists in implementing a set of strategic tasks j 2 [0; 1] : All tasks must be correctly implemented otherwise production does not take place. For each task j; correct implementation requires that the Agent undertakes 5 a time-dependent "correct" action a js at a cost e s :
In the "quality"stage, there is some room for opportunism because we assume that: (1) the Agent is always able to undertake, at zero cost, a wrong action a j ;
(2) the quality (ie. "correct"or "wrong") and the costs (ie. e s or 0) of actions a j are not veri…able by an outside party 6 . Consequently, in absence of a blueprint or a contract describing ex-ante the correct actions a js for each date s; there is an hold-up problem. If the agent undertakes the correct action a js at cost e s ; the …rm has an incentive to deny the quality of her action in order not to pay her ex-post: Anticipating this, the agent has incentives to undertake a wrong action at zero cost.
4.5
The role of codi…cation: from soft to hard information.
Strategic information of the leading-edge …rm in a given sector i corresponds to fa js g, the set of correct actions (or "best practices" as usually denoted in the management literature). Initially this set of information is appropriated by the entrepreneur only (because she is the successful innovator).
The purpose of the KM policy is to share this piece of information with the Agent who needs it to implement correctly the "quality" stage.
As emphasized in the existing empirical literature, we consider two types of KM policies: (1) "faceto-face" interaction: for a given task j; information remains soft and at each date s, the entrepreneur gives to the Agent only the bit of soft information a js : There is no direct communication cost. (2) codi…cation: for a given task j; at the beginning of the relationship, the entrepreneur gives to the Agent a blueprint (or a code of procedures) specifying the correct actions for all periods and contingencies fa js g 8s2(1;2;:::) . Hence soft information is made hard. There is no direct cost of codi…cation. The KM policy implemented by the entrepreneur mixes both strategies. For the leading-edge …rm in a given sector i; a share i of the continuum [0; 1] of tasks is kept under soft information and is transmitted through "face-to-face" interaction, while a share (1 i ) is codi…ed. The choice of i is made at the beginning of the discovery of the leading-edge technology and is irreversible.
Codi…cation bene…ts to internal e¢ ciency. Indeed, by transforming soft information into hard information (ie. the blueprint), codi…cation allows to write down a formal contract describing the set of correct actions which have to be done by the Agent; this consequently solves the hold-up problem for the (1 i ) codi…ed tasks only. Codi…cation however has a cost in term of information leakage. As suggested by the KM literature, codi…ed information assets are more vulnerable to external di¤usion to competitors, especially so with the increased use of IT, Internet and communication technologies. First, codi…ed knowledge can be more easily attacked from the exterior by competitors, hackers and industrial spies. Second, there is a basic increased vulnerability in the transformation problem from soft (non veri…able) information to hard (veri…able) information. Information leakage cannot be perfectly contracted upon, in the sense that information leakage is neither completely observable nor itself veri…able. Indeed, the third party (ie. the lawyer or consultant) who writes down and certi…es the contract cannot fully commit not to reveal to an outside competitor the codi…ed information enclosed in the contract whether through legal or illegal means. Also, the Agent may be able to transmit a piece of hard information to an outside competitor without being convicted 7 . The Agent could …nally alternatively use the knowledge himself to compete successfully with the leading-edge …rm. In a context with imperfect credit markets, this agent might not be able to fully fund the project himself. In such a case, he will get better credit conditions if he can convince potential creditors that his project is viable and competitive. This is of course more likely when he can supply hard information and codi…ed knowledge emanating from the leading-edge …rm's project.
To sum up, these di¤erent channels are likely to increase the probability of di¤usion of hard and codi…ed information compared to soft information. We capture this by assuming that the industrylevel knowledge spillover " i depend positively on the share (1 i ) of hard information and that this immediately and costlessly spreads with some probability to the competitors'population (in mass H i ). Formally, we assume that the spillover " i takes the simple form " i = (1 i ) with 0 (:) > 0 and " (:) < 0. Together with (2) this leads to the following competitive pressure rate:
with 0 + 0 (1 i ) such that 0 < 0 and 00 < 0. We see that the degree of information softness i stands either for the degree of contractual incompleteness and the size of spillover. This dual aspect comes basically from the fact that codi…cation (ie.
switching from soft to hard information) enables the design of more precise contracts but simultaneously promotes informational leakage.
The trade-o¤ faced by the …rm is then pretty clear. Despite the underlying hold-up problem the …rm may still choose to keep part of information soft (ie. i > 0) to reduce information spillover and competitive pressures. In that case, the …rm must use an alternative instrument to mitigate the hold-up problem. Relational contracts (ie. repeated interactions between the …rm and the Agent) or the ownership structure (as studied by the incomplete contracting literature, Grossman and Hart 1986 ) are two possible alternatives.
Steady-state
We focus on steady-state symmetric growth path equilibria across sectors such that 8 8i; j; V is = V js , H is = H js = H, i = j = , is = js = ( ) = ( ) H: Moreover all the following variables grow at the same pace g:
where g is the stationary growth rate prevailing in the economy and equal to 9 :
where (:) is given by equation (6). As 2 (0; 1); this equation shows that the equilibrium value of g can take value only within the range [0; g] where g = (0): log . Finally, we assume for the sake of computational simplicity that the growth rate g, the interest rate r and the creative destruction rate are small with respect to 1: This amounts to saying that the length of periods is short enough so that our discrete model behaves almost as a standard continuous time models of growth. 10
The basic results
This section studies the two instruments used by the …rm for solving the hold up problem, namely relational contracts and ownership structure. We provide here only the sketch of the argument: all technical details are given in the appendix. 8 This comes immediately from the human capital resource constraint
The steady-state growth rate g is computed as in Grossman and Helpman (1991) (see chapter 4 for details). Denoting nis the degree of quality prevailing at date s in industry i: From limit pricing we get that the price in each industry is equal to pis = ws= n is 1 where ws is the competitive wage. Remind that the price index, Ps; is equal to: log(Ps) = R 1 0 log(pis):di: As Y is chosen as a numéraire, we get that log ws = R 1 0 log n is 1 :di and the stationary rate of growth is given by g = log :
1 0 As the reader will soon …gure out, the focus on discrete time is motivated by our desire to model the relationships within the …rm as a repeated game, the analysis of which is much easier in discrete time.
In-house relational contracts
Consider now relational employment contracts inside the organization. At the beginning of the relationship the …rm designs a contract. This contract codi…es a share (1 ) of the tasks and speci…es a wage schedule fw s g which has to be paid to the agent whenever theses tasks are correctly done. Hence the contractual payment fw s g is contingent to only a share of the total set of tasks. With regards to the non codi…ed part of know-how, the agent is "free" to undertake them (at a total cost e s ) as this part of the job is not described in the contract.
The underlying opportunism problem can be solved through relational contracts. The agent is willing to undertake the non codi…ed actions (despite the threat of hold-up) if she expects to get a compensation for her non contractual e¤ort. This compensation takes the form of a non contractual wage ! s (a bonus) that the …rm gives ex-post. As a consequence, an employment relational contract implicitly speci…es two things. First, the agent must undertake at each date s the correct actions on the full set of tasks [0; 1] : Second, the agent receives in exchange a sequence of wage payments (w s ; ! s ) where w s is the formal component paid when the agent proceeds with the right veri…able actions (on the share (1 ) of codi…ed tasks), and ! s is a promised non contractual wage paid when the agent executes the right job on the remaining non codi…ed tasks. That contract needs to be self enforcing for the two parties. Therefore, it should satisfy a) incentive compatibility constraints, both for the agent and the …rm, b) the agent's individual rationality constraint.
The agent's incentive constraint: Focusing on detrended stationary contracts along a stationary growth path, it can be shown that for small values of r; and g; the incentive compatibility constraint of an agent writes as:
This has a straightforward interpretation. The one period gain from cheating 11 (saving the e¤ort cost e on non veri…able tasks) should be less that the value of not cheating. The latter is the sum of the bonus ! received at the end of the period and the expected discounted gains of the cooperative employment relationship in the future. Condition [MIC] clearly shows that any share of information softness can be sustained from the agent's point of view as soon as the bonus ! is su¢ ciently large.
Unfortunately, the …rm will tend to renege on large values of ! and this instrument is di¢ cult to enforce from the …rm's point of view (see below).
The …rm's incentive constraint: Similarly the …rm's incentive constraint can be written as:
The one period gain from cheating 12 on the agent and not paying the bonus !, has to be less than 1 1 After cheating, the agent is …red by the …rm and goes back to the labor market with a bad reputation. This reputation prevents her to be hired by other …rms as a manager and thus constraints her to earn the reservation wage w (see appendix for all the details).
1 2 After cheating on the agent, the …rm gets a bad reputation and no agent will accept to work for the …rm as a manager. The …rm is thus unable to produce anymore and gets 0 cash- ‡ow (see appendix for all the details).
the expected discounted value of the cooperative relationship to the …rm (ie. the RHS). This equation clearly illustrates the trade-o¤ in term of incentives from the …rm's point of view. The larger is the ex-post non-contractual wage !, the more the …rm wants to renege. The larger is the net surplus of the relationship the more the …rm wants to cooperate.
The agent's participation constraint: The per period value of employment w + ! e must be equal to, or larger than, the opportunity cost of working as a production worker w: The appendix shows that the optimal contract is such that the participation constraint is always binding:
For a given stationary growth rate g 2 (0; g); the optimal problem of the …rm is to maximizes its expected discounted value with respect to information softness under (PC)-(MIC)-(FIC), which in detrented value is equal to:
Given that the rate of creative destruction ( ) is decreasing in ; the …rm wants to implement the largest possible value of : Plunging (PC) in conditions (MIC) and (FIC), this means that the optimal and ! are given by the largest value of such that: e ! e w r+ g : This gives:
Result 1: Under in-house relational contracts, the optimal contract is such that: a) the contractual wage compensates the agent for the codi…ed share of know-how only, w = (1 )e + w; b) the non contractual wage compensates for the non veri…able share of know-how ; ! = e: The optimal degree of information softness (g) is below 1; is increasing with the growth rate g and is such that: e = e w r + ( ) g
The intuition is the following. Given that the rate of creative destruction ( ) is decreasing in the degree information softness ; the …rm would like to implement the largest possible value of sustainable through a relational contract (w; !): The sustainability of is however restricted by the fact that the non contractual bonus ! has a limited impact: A large ! always provides correct incentives to the agent (see MIC), but not to the …rm who may have interest to renege on ! instead of rewarding the agent. Given the absence of a commitment device from the …rm's point of view, the latter has to choose a value of strictly less than 1 (codi…cation of information) to mitigate the internal hold up problem.
An increase in the growth rate g tends to increase the degree of information softness . Intuitively, the larger the growth rate g; the more valuable the future cash- ‡ows and wages. It is then important both for the …rm and the agent not to renege now in order to enjoy the gains from future cooperation.
Cooperation becomes easier for both sides and, consequently a larger degree of softness is sustainable.
We call capitalization e¤ ect this positive impact of growth on information softness.
Note …nally that in this type of employment relationship, the …rm's present value writes as:
V in (g) = e w r + ( ) g (10)
Joint ownership and Empowerment
So far, the problem of a two-sided hold-up inside the …rm was solved by the use of relational contracts and reputation based incentives. An alternative is to empower the agent by making a transfer of ownership in his favor. In that case, the …rm does not rely on repeated interactions and relational contracts but on static ex-post bargaining power which is transferred to the agent, as for instance studied in the incomplete contracting literature 13 . Transfer of ownership a¤ects the status quo points of the two parties compared to in-house employment contracts and therefore may have strong implications on the ex ante incentives.
As before, at the beginning of the relationship the …rm decides its level of informational softness , taking as given the rest of the economy. Under Joint Participation, the agent owns his production such that p is the price at which the agent will sell production to the …rm. This price will be negotiated ex post between the two parties at the end of the spot relationship. We assume also that the agent has a limited liability constraint 14 . Finally we assume that joint-ownership does not increase communication costs between the …rm and the agent. 15 As already said, for the …rm the bene…t of transferring ownership to the worker comes from the fact that the hold up problem is partially solved in a one-shot interaction. Therefore, the …rm is able to sustain a higher level of information softness and can protect better its incumbent position against technological competition. The cost of joint ownership is the fact that the …rm now looses some rents (whereas in the in-house relationship it was capturing the whole surplus).
Consider now the price p at which the agent sells his production to the …rm. This price is …xed after a bilateral bargaining stage which maximizes the joint surplus : Outside options of both agents are zero and we immediately get that: p = 2 .
The agent receives p only when the overall quality is achieved. Given that the surplus of the relationship is assumed to be large enough, ie. =2 e > w; (see assumption A 3 in appendix), the agent always undertakes the full degree of e¤ort whatever the degree of softness of information. As a consequence, the …rm is able to sustain, under joint ownership, an extreme level of softness = 1 in order to reduce information leakage. From the …rm's point of view, the surplus is equal to =2 at 1 3 Here we consider only the case of spot outsourcing contracts in which the …rm decides to transmit ownership to the agent of tasks the latter is supposed to produce (the …rm keeps ownership on the remaining tasks). See Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002) for a discussion on relational outsourcing contracts.
1 4 In our present setting, the assumption of limited liability implies that there could not be an ex-ante license fee, W; that the agent pays to the …rm in order to get the right to produce for the …rm. It is therefore not possible for the …rm to achieve its …rst best contract under joint ownership.
1 5 This assumption allows us to concentrate again on the role of external competitive pressures in the design of the optimal organizational structure of the …rm. Clearly all we say will still qualitatively be valid if the increased communication costs between the agent and the …rm due to joint ownership are not too large. each date. Hence the …rm's intertemporal total surplus is equal to:
Result 2: Assume that =2 e > w: Under joint ownership: a full degree of information softness can be sustained, ie. = 1; and is actually implemented by the …rm. 16
KM-policy and the choice of organization
Let us now consider the optimal choice of organizational form between in-house production (based on a relational employment contract) and joint ownership along a stationary growth path characterized by a given growth rate g. The …rm decides to share ownership whenever:
where V in is given by (22) and (10); and V out is given by (11). This condition writes as:
Hereafter we denoteg the growth rate value such that the previous condition holds as an equality. In the appendix we show the following:
Result 3: For 0 g g; in-house production is preferred while forg g g, joint ownership is preferred.
The intuition for this result is as follows. The relative cost of joint ownership compared to inhouse production comes from a reduced ‡ow of income in each period. The relative advantage of joint ownership comes from the increased capacity to sustain softness which reduces the probability to be technologically leapfrogged by a competitor. This in turn increases the expected lifetime of the …rm.
This relative advantage is all the more valuable to the …rm that it enjoys a large capitalization e¤ect of its asset value along its life time. The larger the growth rate, the larger the capitalization e¤ect and the larger the relative advantage of the joint ownership organizational form. When the growth rate is small, the capitalization e¤ect is weak and in-house production tends to dominate because of the larger ‡ows of income that the …rm receives. Hence this result illustrates how the KM-policy of a …rm and its organizational structure in term of ownership are closely interrelated. between the two organizational strategies; this is represented by the vertical segment on the …gure.
Macroeconomic equilibrium
In this section we solve for the macroeconomic variables which play a key role in the previous analysis, e.g. the growth rate g and the competitive rate w: The demand for labor has two components: a demand for (supervising) Agents which is always equal to 1 and a demand for (producing) workers, which is, under limit pricing, equal to Y s = w s : Consequently the labor market clearing condition is:
Along a stationary growth path, Y t and w t grow at the same rate g with Y s = (1 + g) s Y and w s =
(1 + g) s w. It follows that the market clearing condition boils down to : L = 1 + Y = w.
Moreover from limit-pricing by monopolies we know that w = P: But the price of the …nal good is the numeraire. It follows that the competitive wage is such that w = 1 : Plunging back this term into the market clearing condition, we get Y = L 1: From equation (5), the detrended value of cash- ‡ow can be written as = (1 1 ):(L 1); the net surplus of the …rm is thus equal to S e w = (1 1= )(L 1) e 1 : As a consequence the macro equilibrium is characterized by two conditions.
First, the aggregate spillover condition ties down the value of the stationary growth rate to the …rm choice of softness of information. It is simply given by condition (8):
where (:) is given by equation (6).
Second, the KM-condition associates the …rm level choice of to the aggregate rate of growth.
This KM-condition has been studied in the previous section and is given by (12) and (22) which, together with labor market clearing condition, writes as: e = S r + ( ) g for g <g;
(KM) = 1 for g g whereg is given by the equality in condition (12).
On …gure 1, the upward sloping curve (KM) corresponds to the KM condition while the downward sloping curve (AS) corresponds to the aggregate spillover curve. We get the immediate result
Result 4: A steady state equilibrium always exists and is unique.
probability must be compatible with the aggregate growth rateg as given by (8). This means that is such that:
Depending on the locus of the KM curve and the AS curve, three di¤erent types of equilibria may emerge: a in-house relational equilibrium, a joint ownership equilibrium one and an equilibrium where both types of organizational forms coexist.
Comparative statics and extensions
In this section we perform various comparative statics relying on graphical support. All computational details are given in the appendix.
The Bell-shaped evolution of knowledge codi…cation
We start our comparative statics exercises with the impact of the long run evolution of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). As discussed in the empirical literature (see section 3), the spread of ICTs has increased the relative speed of di¤usion and transmission of hard information. In our framework (see section 4.3 and condition 2) the knowledge spillover spreads to competitors with a probability . We therefore interpret as the e¢ ciency of ICTs.
On …gure 2, an increase in has a direct e¤ect on the aggregate spillover curve (AS) which shifts upwards. For a given an improvement in ICTs' e¢ ciency increases informational spillover and thus the aggregate growth rate of the economy. The e¤ect on the KM-curve is less obvious. First, it unambiguously reduces (0;g) which corresponds to the range of the growth rate where in-house production is preferred to joint ownership by …rms. The reason is that the increase in ICTs e¢ ciency makes, for a given degree ; the cost of information leakage more important. Firms therefore try to reduce codi…cation. This is done by switching from in-house production to joint ownership (where = 1 is sustainable). Hence ICTs di¤usion promotes joint ownership.
Second, within the in-house regime, there is a creative destruction e¤ ect that stands for the fact that an increase in directly increases competitive pressure at the microeconomic level; this in turn makes relational contracts less sustainable for a given g. This reduces the degree of soft information which can be sustained with relational contracts and corresponds to a downward shift of the KM curve within the range (0;g).
Summarizing, for low values of ; an increase in maintains …rst the economy within the in-house regime but decreases : On the other hand for large values of ; an increase in promotes the joint ownership regime and increases . As a result, the degree of codi…cation is a bell-shaped curve with respect to the e¢ ciency of ICTs (see …gure 3).
Given equations (6) and (AS), the growth rate is given by g = [1 + (1 i )] 0 H log : An increase in has a direct e¤ect on g through an increase in the scope of informational spillover. But it also has an indirect e¤ect through the endogenous shift in the degree of codi…cation . While the direct e¤ect is always positive, the indirect e¤ect is positive (resp. negative) when the degree of codi…cation (resp. softness) is endogenously promoted by the di¤usion of ICTs. Both e¤ects go in the same direction as long as the economy remains in the in-house regime. Hence, growth increases with ICTs e¢ ciency. On the contrary, when softness increases, this last feature does not hold anymore along the transition from the in-house regime to the joint ownership regime (a look at …gure 3 should convince the reader that the indirect e¤ect dominates). In this transitory regime, growth decreases with ICTs. Finally, when the whole economy has shifted toward joint ownership, information is only under a soft form ( = 1) and consequently the increase in has no e¤ect anymore in the growth rate, neither through the direct e¤ect nor the indirect one (see …gure 3).
All this discussion may be summarized as follows:
Result 5: When increases , the economy switches from a in-house equilibrium to a joint ownership equilibrium. There is a Bell-shaped relationship between the level of information codi…cation (1 ) and : Finally, there is a decrease in the aggregate growth rate during the transition phase from the in-house regime to the joint ownership regime (see …gure 3) .
This result suggests that ICTs may not necessarily a¤ect positively growth and the scope of informational spillover, when …rms adjust endogenously their KM policies. More precisely, the di¤usion of ICTs can strengthen the threat of informational spillover so much that in reaction, …rms reduce the degree of codi…cation of their know-how. This in turn results in a decrease in aggregate knowledge spillover and a reduced growth rate.
This comparative statics is suggestive of the after war period of economic expansion. The Mass Production regime corresponds, in our framework, to a regime of high growth, high codi…cation, large informational spillover and internal incentives sustained by intertemporal labor contracts whereas the Knowledge based Economy is initially characterized by a improvement of ICTs e¢ ciency, a productivity slowdown , a switch toward more information softness and internal incentives sustained by "empowered" spot labor contracts. It is also somehow consistent with the dramatic change of corporate structures in the late 80s and during the 90s and the corresponding emergence of vertical disintegration, joint ownership and the erosion of internal labor markets.
Growth and scale e¤ects
Consider now an increase of the stock of skilled workers H available for innovation and R&D in the economy. It is …rst worth noting that within our framework, an increase in H drives qualitatively the same results 18 as an increase in : Hence the following result :
Result 6: When the stock of skilled workers H increases , the economy switches from a in-house equilibrium to a joint ownership equilibrium. There is a Bell-shaped relationship between the level of information codi…cation (1 ) and H: Finally, there is a decrease in the aggregate growth rate during the transition phase from the in-house regime to the joint ownership regime.
A …rst implication of this result is the fact that the dramatic rise in skilled workforce experienced since the 1970s in many developed countries economies (see Acemoglu 2002 for a discussion) could help explain the switch form Mass production to Knowledge based Economy and the observed transformations in …rms'organizations.
More interestingly, the non monotonic comparative statics on the growth rate can be related to the literature on scale e¤ects in endogenous growth models. The …rst generation of endogenous growth models (Romer 1990 , Aghion and Howit 1992 , Grossman and Helpman 1991 was characterized by the existence of strong scale e¤ects, namely the fact that the growth rate of an economy is an increasing function of its size or positively related to the stock of resources available for innovation and R&D.
While the very long run history of economic growth appears consistent with the existence of strong scale e¤ects (see Kremer, 1993) , they are inconsistent with the relative stability of growth rates in the United States in the 20th century (though the stock of researchers has steadily increased during the same period). Nor do they match stylized recent cross country evidence on growth patterns. Models getting rid of growth scale e¤ects have been developed in the literature. However, either these models are semi endogenous growth models (Jones 1995 , Segerstrom 1998 with policy invariant growth rates, either these models maintain the potency of policy to alter long run growth (Young 1998 , Dinopoulos and Thompson 1998 , Howitt 1999 at the cost of several knife-edge assumptions (for a survey, see Jones 2005) .
Our present setting starts with a work-horse model of endogenous growth model generating growth scale e¤ects (putting therefore ourselves in the worst possible situation to reduce them). Still, adding endogenous informational ‡ows (soft versus hard) and their implications for the structure of knowledge spillover in the economy, triggers ambiguous scale e¤ects in growth. In particular, our approach suggests that the strength of scale e¤ ects in idea-based growth models can be mitigated by the changing nature of informational ‡ows. Moreover, in our context, this aspect is most likely to occur when we have high di¤usion of ICTs technologies and/or an already large stock of research personnel in the economy. These last facts seem to …t relatively well the evolution of OECD countries in the last 40 years, period for which strong scale e¤ects on growth seem to be the least relevant.
Finally, it is worth noting that an additional feature of our current approach is the fact that long run growth (even with ambiguous strong scale e¤ects) can still be a¤ected by policy variables. Indeed, in this setting, growth depends on the nature of informational ‡ows which in turn is a function of institutional and policy variables a¤ecting the environment of the …rm (patent laws, ownership structures, labor contracts laws). Therefore, there still remains scope for policy impacts on long run growth in a context somewhat more generic than other scale free endogenous growth models. 19
Social embeddedness
In a celebrated book, Saxenian (1996) In this section, we brie ‡y discuss how our framework can be amended to capture this link between social embeddedness, knowledge spillover and …rms' internal organization. The literature on social networks has highlighted two channels through which social networks a¤ect individual behavior: norms and information: the social norm channel emphasizes how a person's behavior is a¤ected by social and peer pressure within the network while the information channel emphasizes how a person's knowledge depends on the network she belongs to.
The information channel is associated to the fact that social network tend to speed the spread of information, either hard or soft, through face-to-face interactions or social gathering. Analytically, this issue is very much the same as the one discussed above on the impact of ICTs di¤usion. Similar results apply and, consequently a culture of information sharing promotes joint ownership and has non monotonic e¤ect on the degree of softness.
The social norm channel relates to the absence of anonymity and the existence of social reputation, which by triggering collective retaliation in case of defection, plays a key role in sustaining cooperation within relational contracts. Hence, the strength and persistence of reputation is in some ways similar to the existence of social pressure. Social pressure obviously a¤ects positively the sustainability of cooperation of the in-house regime with relational contracts between the entrepreneur and the agent.
The larger it is, the more stringent is retaliation by society in case of cheating. At the same time 2 0 see chapter 2 where Saxenian describes the Silicon Valley as a technical community where "informal conversations were pervasive and served as an important source of up-to-date information about competitors, customers markets, and technologies".
2 1 See the chapter entitled "Route 128: independence and hierarchy", where it is said that "Route 128s technology enterprises imitated the structure of the traditional mass production corporation. While Silicon's Valley entrepreneurs rejected the corporate practices of the large, established East Coast producers".
2 2 See chapter 3 where it is argued that "the managers of Route 128 technology companies [...] created organizations characterized by formal decisionmaking procedures and management styles, loyal long-term employees and conservative workplace procedures." however, it plays no role under joint ownership. In that case, the hold-up ine¢ ciency due to softness is solved through an increase in the worker spot bargaining power due to a partial transfer of ownership.
In the appendix, we present a simple formal extension of these ideas and show that the equilibrium is described by equations similar to (AS) and (KM). Two features can be simply deduced from the analysis. First, the larger the degree of social pressure, the larger the degree of softness which can be sustained for a given growth rate g: This corresponds to an upward shift of the KM-curve (see …gure 4). Second, the larger the degree of social pressure; the larger the range (0;g) of growth rates for which in-house production is preferred to joint ownership. Hence initially, if the economic equilibrium is at E 0 as shown in …gure 4 with joint ownership and full softness of information (ie. = 1), an increase in social pressures , is going to generate a mixed equilibrium along the vertical part of the KM curve, with the fraction of in-house production …rms increasing overtime. As goes up, the threshold ratẽ g increases and the equilibrium point moves down along the AS curve. Hence as long as one stays within the mixed production regime, an increase in leads to a decrease in information softness and an increase in the equilibrium growth rate g. This process goes on until we reach a "full in-house" equilibrium where the AS curve intersects the KM curve on its upward sloping part.(as shown for instance by point E 1 ). Then in this full "in-house" production regime, as the upward sloping part of KM is shifted up with an increase in , the equilibrium point E 1 moves up along the AS curve, implying now an increase in information softness and a reduction of the equilibrium growth rate g.
The preceding discussion can then be therefore summarized in the following result:
Result 7: An increase in the degree of social pressure promotes in-house production. Information softness within the economy is …rst decreasing and then increasing with the degree of social pressure.
Conversely, the growth rate of the economy …rst increases and then decreases with the degree of social pressure.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to investigate one facet of the incentives for organizations to keep soft informational ‡ows or to codify part of them. We emphasize a trade-o¤ shaped by the con ‡ict between internal incentives and external competitive pressures. This provides a natural channel through which competition has some impact on …rms organizational structure and informational ‡ows. Because of the consequences for knowledge spillover in the rest of the economy, the nature of informational ‡ows inside organizations has in turn feedback e¤ects on macroeconomic performances and growth.
In order to illustrate these mechanisms in the most simple way, we abstracted from many other facets of the problem of soft information and its di¤usion into society. First, we abstracted from technological constraints related to costs of communication and costs of codi…cation. Introducing them would add another margin the …rm needs to take into account in its decisions to codify or not some of its knowledge stock. Secondly, our framework consider simple contracting settings and one may wish to extend our analysis to more complex environments. For instance, one may think to investigate more systematically the role of social networks and communities to stabilize the problems of opportunism based on soft information. The degree of codi…cation of information inside and across organizations will then be shaped by the structure of social links. In turn, one may expect the structure of social networks to be dependent on the nature of informational ‡ows spreading between them.
Finally, our setting endogenize knowledge spillover in a rather crude way. In particular, we do not provide a precise microfounded description of the process through which hard information gets di¤used in the society. This could be due to labor market turnover, migration, industrial spying, informational spillover from regulating parties, etc. Understanding precisely these mechanisms is certainly an important line for future research. We hope that incorporating such extensions into our setting could then be helpful to improve our understanding of the nature of knowledge spillover and their implications in various economic areas like international trade, FDI, economic geography or development.
Technical Appendix

A Equilibrium Analysis
In order to simplify the computations, some assumptions related to the value of parameters are useful.
Assumptions A 0 and A 1 are standard. Assumption A 2 ensures that a full degree of softness (ie. = 1) cannot be sustained under in-house regime. Assumption A 3 ensures that the joint ownership regime is sustainable.
A.1 In-house relational employment contracts
We make the following informational assumptions. All workers and …rms know the identity of …rms and employees in all previous periods as long as the …rm is still into business. As soon as the employer's project is leapfrogged and disappears, the reputation of that particular …rm and all the agents who have been employed by that employer vanish. Both agents go back to anonymity. In other words, we suppose that reputation is project-speci…c. At each date, a worker knows all his history of wage payments ! t and w t and work performances in a given employment relationship. He also knows whether a …rm, which he has been employed in any past period, has delivered any promised non contractual payment ! t . At each date, each …rm knows the history of past wage payments ! t and w t paid to all his past workers and also knows the work performances history of its employees whilst employed with the …rm.
An employment relational contract speci…es that the agent must undertake at each date t the right action on the full set of tasks [0; 1] and will receive in exchange a sequence of wage payments (w t ; ! t ) where w t is the formal component paid when the agent has made the right veri…able actions on the share (1 ) of the hard tasks and ! t is a promised non contractual wage paid when the agent has made the part of the job on the remaining non codi…ed tasks. That contract needs to be self enforcing for the two parties. It should therefore satisfy incentive compatibility constraints both for the agent and the …rm and the agent's individual rationality constraint.
The agent' s incentive constraint:
Let consider an agent hired at date t: At any further date t+s; the incentive compatibility constraint of the agent should make sure that the agent derives a higher discounted utility from not shirking than shirking. This can be written as:
Assuming that the …rm pays the relational contract in each period, when the agent does not shirk, he will earn w t+s+ + ! t+s+ e t+s+ with 0 as long as the project remains on the leading edge. If he cheats at t + s, he undertakes an e¤ort only on the hard share of tasks, faces a cost (1 )e t+s and receives only the contractual wage w t+s : However he will be dismissed by the …rm and goes back to the market with a "bad"reputation. 23 He will get only the reservation wage w t+s+ as long as the project is on the leading edge for > 0: .This condition can be written as:
>From Levin (2003) we know that in this environment, the detrended optimal contract is a stationary contract such that w s = (1 + g) s t w t and ! s = (1 + g) s t ! t : The previous constraint takes then a simpler form:
fw t+s + ! t+s e t+s w t+s g This incentive constraint must be true at any date t + s after the hiring. Together with the steady state condition, the agent's incentive constraint becomes then (in detrented value):
Note that when (16) holds, (15) holds for any date t + s after the hiring. Hence if the incentive compatibility constraint is satis…ed at the beginning of the relationship, it is also satis…ed for periods thereafter. For small values of r; and g ((16)) becomes:
The …rm' s incentive constraint: Let us consider now the incentive compatibility constraint of the …rm. Consider again a relationship beginning at date t: The …rm's incentive constraint corresponds to the case where at any further date t + s after the hiring date t; the return to cooperation always dominates the return to cheating. This can be written as:
At any further date t + s; a cooperative …rm receives t+s and compensates the agent by giving her the contractual wage w t+s and the non-contractual wage ! t+s : In that case cooperation between the …rm and the agent is sustained through time and the relationship lasts with the project. If the …rm decides to cheat at date t + s, the …rm receives t+s ; gives the contractual wage w t+s to the agent but reneges on the noncontractual wage ! t+s despite the agent's cooperation. However at any further date t + s + ; the …rm's reputation of being non reliable will spread through the market and no agent will accept to cooperate with this …rm; as the degree of codi…cation is …xed only once (at date t); this means that the …rm will be unable to produce correctly and will get zero cash- ‡ow as long as the project is on the leading edge for > 0 . Using again stationary contracts along a stationary growth path, we can rewrite the …rm's incentive constraint in detrended terms as:
The agent' s participation constraint:
Finally the contract has to satisfy the agent participation constraint. When hired by a …rm, the agent undertakes an e¤ort e t for a compensation scheme w t + ! t ; his reservation wage (ie. employed as a production worker) is w t : When the …rm is destroyed, with a probability ; the agent goes back to the labor market. Hence the agent's participation constraint writes as:
(1 ) (1 + r) w t+s+ Along a stationary growth path and with stationary contracts, the agent's participation constraint collapses to:
The set of contracts sustaining a given degree of softness Consider a given degree of softness and let us call ( ), the set of relational contracts (w; !) which can sustain cooperation between the agent and the …rm for this degree of softness. ( ) is described in the space (w; !) by the constraints (17)-(18)-(19); ( ) is depicted on …gure A1. It is not empty as long as the agent's constraint is below the …rm's constraint. Simple computations show that it is the case i¤: e e w r + ( ) g
For a given it is clear that the …rm prefers to pay the smallest compensation scheme w + !: This corresponds to contracts located on the segment OO 0 where the agent's participation constraint is binding 24 . Hence as soon as is sustainable (ie. condition (20) is satis…ed) the participation constraint is binding, w + ! = e + w; and the …rms captures the whole surplus of the relationship. In other words the e¢ ciency wage policy is always dominated by the ex-post compensation policy: for a given ; the …rm always prefers to incite the agent through ! rather than through the e¢ ciency wage (w e w):
The reason is that the latter one is costly whereas both instruments are perfectly similar in terms of incentive provision [ie. they are substitute either in the agent's incentive constraint (see condition MIC) and in the …rm's incentive constraint (see condition FIC)] 25 . Let denote RHS( ; g) the right-hand-side of (23). Clearly @RHS @g > 0: And 8g 2 [0; g]; RHS(0; g)
(1 1 )(L 1) e 1 r+ (0)(1 log ) which is positive according to assumption A 0 : >From assumption A 1 we get @RHS @ > 0 and @ 2 RHS @ 2 > 0: Hence RHS( ; g) is increasing and convex in : For a given g; equation (23) is depicted in …gure A2. Two cases may happen. First: RHS(1; g) < e; this means that there is one and only one < 1 such that e = RHS( ; g); this corresponds to the degree of information softness chosen by the …rm. Second: RHS(1; g) > e; this would mean that a full degree of softness could be sustained; however assumption A 2 implies that RHS(1; g) < e=3 < e; RHS being increasing in g; this means that 8g 2 [0; g]; RHS(1; g) < e and so this case is impossible.
Di¤erentiating (23) we get:
A look at …gure A2;case 1; should convince the reader that at the intercept between the two curves, the slope of e is larger than the slope of RHS( ; g); hence @RHS=@ < e; this implies that 0 ( ) + 1 :(r + ( ) g) > 0 and so we get d dg > 0: To sum up this section, we have shown that the implicit in equation (22) is such that 8g 2 [0; g]; 0 (g) > 0 and (g) 2 [0; ] where < 1:
A.2 In-House vs Joint Ownership
In the main text we show that joint-ownership is preferred to in-house production when: r + ( ) g r + (1) g e w =2
( 25) where is given by equation (23). Let W (g) and be respectively the left-hand-side and the righthand-side of condition (25). Assumption A 3 means that > 1: Consider now a point of "indi¤erence"g 2 [0; g] where condition (25) is an equality: W (g) = : An obvious di¤erentiation gives: Sg(W 0 (g)) = Sg (~ )
(1) + 0 (~ ): d dg :(r + (1) g)
The sign of the right-hand-side of (26) is ambiguous as 8~ 2 [0; 1]; (~ ) > (1) but 0 (~ ) < 0 and d dg :(r + (1) g) > 0: However using the de…nition ofg and equation (24), we have: Sg(W 0 (g)) = Sg( (~ ) (1) + 0 (~ ):( :~ 1 + 0 (~ ):~ :2e= ) 1 ) where~ 2 [0; ]: From assumptions A 1 ; A 2 and A 3 we get: Sg(W 0 (g)) Sg( ( ) (1) + 0 ( ):( 1 + 0 ( ): ) 1 ): But (:) being convex, the theorem of intermediate values guaranties that: 8 2 [0; 1]; ( ( ) (1)):( 1) 1 0 ( ): Consequently we have: Sg(W 0 (g)) Sg( 0 ( ):(2 1 + ( ( ) (1))): By de…nition, is given by condition (23) with g = g (0) log ; hence from assumption A 2 we get that 1=3 which implies that: Sg(W 0 (g)) 0: This last inequality means that at the pointg where W (g) = , the function W (:) is upward sloping and W 0 (g) 0; but W (:) is continuous and di¤erentiable on [0; g]; consequently we know that there is at most one pointg 2 [0; g] such that W (g) = : In that case 8g 2 [0;g]; W (g) and 8g 2 [g; g]; W (g)
: From condition (25) this means that V IN (g) V OU T (g) if g g; and V OU T (g) V IN (g) if g g whereg is the only point on [0; g] where condition (25) is an equality.
B Comparative Statics
B.1 ICTs
The variable impacts the economy through (:) which according to equation (6) is given by ( ) = [1 + (1 i )] 0 H. The equilibrium is characterized by equations (8), (KM) and (12) and is depicted on …gure 3 in the main text. For g g; the equilibrium writes down as e = RHS( ; g; ) where g = ( ) log and the de…nition of RHS(:; :) is given above in the appendix. A straightforward di¤erentiation gives:
This expression is negative; indeed from the de…nition of RHS it is obvious that @RHS=@ < 0; and we show above that e > @RHS=@ : For g g the joint ownership regime prevails and the equilibrium is characterized by = 1 and g = f (0; H): log : Hence it is obvious that does not impact the equilibrium within this regime.
Finally the threshold valueg is such that condition (25) is an equality: W (g) = : A straightforward di¤erentiation gives: dg d = @W=@ @W=@g 0
This term is negative because we show above that @W=@g is positive for the value g =g and from the de…nition of W (:) it is clear that @W=@ 0.
B.2 Social pressure
As discussed in the main text the social pressure parameter a¤ects the aggregate equilibrium only in the in-house regime. Let be the probability that reputation does not disappear from one period to the other (ie. 1 is correspondingly the probability that the agent goes back to anonymity). For a agent; let denote U t the market present value of bad reputation, U t the value of anonymity and U coop the value of cooperating with the entrepreneur. Agent's incentive constraint writes down w t (1 )e t + 1 1 + r (1 ) U t+1 + (1 )U t+1 + U t+1 w t + ! t e t + 1 1 + r (1 )U coop t+1 + U t+1
Using the fact that U coop t = P 1
=1
(1 ) (1+g)
fw t + ! t e t w t g ; straightforward computations show that the incentive constraint writes down in detrented terms as:
For an entrepreneur, let denote V t the market present value of not being on the leading edge, V t the value of being on the leading edge with a good reputation (0 is clearly the value of being on the leading edge with a bad reputation, as in the benchmark model) and V coop t the value of cooperating with the agent. Entrepreneur's incentive constraint writes down
Using the fact that in detrented value, we have V coop = (r + g) 1 : f w ! wg ; V = (r + g) 1 : v, some computations show that the incentive constraint writes down in detrented terms as:
The agent's participation constraint is not changed and is equal to:
As in the benchmark case, the optimal contract for sustaining a given degree of softness is such that the three constraints (27)-(28)-(29) are binding. Hence workers are always paid at their reservation wage and consequently we get u u = 0 in (27). As a consequence is given by 0 e = ( e w (1 ) v)=(r + ( ) g): But v = e w: Hence: 0 e = ( e w)=(r + ( ) g) and the KM-curve is now given by: e = : S r + ( ) g for g <g(
); = 1 for g g(
)
The growth rateg corresponding to indi¤erence between in-house production and joint ownership is still given by condition (25) which writes down as: W (g) = : Di¤erentiating gives dg=d = :W 0 (g) which is positive as we show previously that W 0 (g) 0: Hence we get thatg( ) is an increasing function. 
